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Abstract
This article demonstrates that individuals with an engineering education are three to
four times more frequent among violent Islamists worldwide than other degree
holders. We then test a number of hypotheses to account for this phenomenon. We
argue that a combination of two factors – engineers’ relative deprivation in the
Islamic world and mindset – is the most plausible explanation.
Keywords: Jihad; Islamism; Engineers; Political violence; Education; Relative
deprivation.
Introduction1
S i n c e t h e e a r l y 1980s, numerous authors have mentioned in
passing the link between science and engineering and radical Islam.2
1 We wish to thank Peter Bergen, Ronan
Gunaratna, Thomas Hegghammer, and
Swati Pandey for sharing their data with us,
and, for their help with various detailed
pieces of information, Roberto Franzosi,
Stephane Lacroix, Steven Lukes, Thomas
Pierret, Josh Pollack, Maria Sobolewska,
Valeria Pizzini-Gambetta, Larry Wright,
and several Gulf2000 listserv members. We
are very grateful to Becky Kahane, Jane
Roberts, Neil Rudisill, Marina Tzvetkova
and Karsten Wekel for their invaluable re-
search assistance, and to Ken MacDonald for
his statistical advice. Finally, we are indebted
to Michael Biggs, Annalisa Cristini, Jon Elster,
Nils Petter Gleditsch, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten,
Ekaterina Hertog, Elisabeth Longuenesse,
Rick Ludkin, Tiziana Nazio, John Owen,
Andrea Patacconi, Roger Petersen, Valeria
Pizzini-Gambetta, Tom Snijders, Anna
Zimdars, and participants in the CSCW
Workshop on The Role of First Actors in civil
war, held at PRIO, Oslo, on 17-18 August
2006, as well as participants at the Nuffield
College Sociology Seminar and the Princeton
Department for Near Eastern Studies’ semi-
nar series, for comments on earlier drafts.
2 Bergen and Pandey 2006; Hoffman
1995; Huntington 1996, p. 112; Ibrahim
1980; Roy 1990; Sageman 2004, p. 76;
Schulze 1990, p. 22; Wickham 2002, p. 1;
Wright 2006, p. 301.
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Some have speculated about what might explain it.3 No one, however,
has attempted to find a systematic confirmation of the phenomenon,
let alone an empirically grounded explanation. Scholars have found
evidence of a positive correlation between level of education and
militancy both among Islamic and left-wing radicals.4 Almost noth-
ing is known, however, about the link between different types of
education and radicalization generally. Yet, there are good grounds,
and some evidence that we discuss below, to expect that certain
political and ideological orientations could be either promoted or
selected by the discipline one chooses to study.
Much of the literature on extremism claims that there is no clear
‘‘terrorist profile’’: radical Islamists have few individual traits in
common (Nesser 2004; Sageman 2004; on profiling failures cf.
Capoccia, forthcoming). Yet, it appears improbable that anyone can
become radicalized if only the circumstances are right. Individual
choices based on cognitive and personality traits are likely to play
a role at least at the point when broader ideological networks get pared
down and radicalized. Such traits tend to be very hard to observe
when it comes to militants, certainly on a statistically relevant scale.
The choice of education is one of the few micro-level features on
which we have reasonably reliable data, which could betray underlying
individual traits.
This is the rationale of the present article. Its first part will examine
a wide range of evidence to establish the size of the engineers’
presence among Islamic radicals, both in the Muslim and in the
Western world; in addition, we consider their presence in two control
groups, non-violent Islamic groups as well as non-Islamic extremist
groups. In the second part, we try to make sense of the pattern of
findings, testing both environmental and individual-level explanations
for the distribution of degrees among Islamist radicals.
1. Islamic extremists in Muslin countries
To test whether engineers are really over-represented, we compiled
a list of 404 members of violent Islamist groups in the Muslim world
drawing from a variety of sources (Table 1). In the sample there are
3 Abuza 2006; Bergen and Pandey 2006;
Sageman 2004, p. 76; Schulze 1990, n. 22;
Waltz 1986.
4 Russell and Miller 1977; Krueger
and Maleckova 2003; Krueger 2007;
Berrebi 2003; Ricolfi 2005.
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individuals from 30 nationalities, 9 larger groups and no less than
a dozen smaller groups. This set does not fully represent what is
a varied universe of unknown size, but is large and disparate enough to
allow us to establish whether the puzzle holds true.
t a b l e i
Sample sources
Description Source N
International jihadis involved
in 1993 World Trade Center
attack, 1998 bombing of
US embassies in Africa,
2002 Bali bombings, and
September 11
Provided by Peter
Bergen and Swati
Pandey, complemented
by library and
internet research
75
International salafi jihadis Sageman (2004),
combined with
library and
internet research
126
Hamas (Palestine) Hamas websites,
Rangwala (2005);
Smith et al. (2003)
81
Takfir Al-Hijra and
Military Academy
Group (Egypt)
Ibrahim (1980, 1982) 34
Jamaa Islamiya
(South East Asia)
Singaporean
government
documentation
31
Islamic Jihad (Palestine) Websites
and literature
18
Sundry cases (further
Afghani, Pakistani,
Egyptian and
Iraqi groups)
Websites
and literature;
daily press
surveys;
Smith et al. (2003)
39
Total 404
3
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Education levels
We searched wherever we could for information on each of the 404
individuals in our sample, and found some biographical information
for 326 cases and educational information for 284. Out of these, 196
had higher education, whether finished or unfinished (at least 37
studied in Western countries), whose median date of birth is 1968.
The share of individuals with higher education appears impressive:
69.0 %. This is much higher than the tertiary enrolment rates in the
various countries of origin (12.2 % in the Arab world in the 1980s;
Longuenesse 1990, p. 329). Only in the South East Asian groups the
level of education lower was than in the rest of the sample.
Education types
We were able to find the subject of study for 178 of the 196 cases
who were engaged in higher education at some point (Figure 1).
Unsurprisingly, we found that the second most numerous group was
composed of 34 individuals who pursued Islamic studies. Yet, the
group that comes first by far are indeed the engineers: 78 out of 178
individuals had studied this subject. This means that 44 % of those
whose type of degree we know were engineers. On the whole, the
individuals who studied for what we may call ‘‘elite degrees’’ – engineering,
f i g . i
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medicine, and science, generally the most selective programs in the
Islamic world – represent 56.7 %.
Our sample could be biased. For instance, lower-level operatives in
certain groups are less likely to be reported, and these might have
generally lower levels of education. Yet, there is no reason to expect
a systematic reporting bias regarding the type of education.
A further finding gives us confidence in the robustness of our
result: the predominance of engineers is not clustered in any one of the
sample groups, but spread evenly across them. The same obtains if we
re-arrange the data by the subjects’ nationality – with the exception of
Saudi Arabians which we discuss below.
How much over-represented are they?
We estimate that the average share of engineers among the total male
working population in the countries of our sample, weighted by the
number of cases per country, is about 3.5%.5 If we leave out Singapore,
a country with an extraordinarily high number of engineers, the share
is 2.1 %. By contrast, even if we include all missing values in the
denominator, engineers are still about 19 % of our total sample (78/404),
nine times greater than a null hypothesis would predict.
But how do engineers compare to other graduates? To address this
question we must compare our results with (male) enrolment rates in
different subjects. We found this data for twelve countries covering
169 of the 196 relevant cases with higher education. The over-
representation of engineers in our sample is present for all these
nationalities except Saudi Arabia (see below). The average share of
engineers among total male students weighted by the number of cases
with higher education per nationality in our sample is 18.0 %, while
the ratio of engineers over those with known higher education in our
sample is 43.8 %. The odds of being an engineer in our sample are
three and a half times greater (significant at p,.001).
The Saudi exception
When looking at the nationality of the individuals in our sample,
one peculiarity worth noting emerges: scattered across several of our
groups there is a contingent of 25 Saudis, 11 of whom have higher
5 This is based on labor market data from
Longuenesse (1990, p. 328) as well as
UNESCO education data (2005).
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education, with the subject known for 9 cases. Only one of them is an
engineer. This gains significance when we consider another sample of
Saudi Islamic insurgents collected by Thomas Hegghammer (2006).
Out of a ‘‘core’’ of 70 violent Islamists active in the recent domestic
insurgency in Saudi Arabia, he found educational data on 36, 17 of
whom had college exposure. Among the 11 of these for whom the
subject is known, five pursued religious degrees but again only one
was an engineer. Combining the data, we find only 2 engineers among
20 cases with known higher education. Finally, among the 25 in-
dividuals involved in 9/11, there were fifteen Saudis and eight
engineers. A full seven of the ten non-Saudis were engineers, but
only one Saudi was. What are we to make of this exception? We will
return to this later.
2. Islamic extremists in Western countries
Before attempting to explain what’s ‘‘wrong’’ with engineers, we
must consider whether they are overrepresented also among a different
group of violent Islamic extremists, namely those born in or residents
of Western countries who became active in recent times, mostly after
9/11. For this purpose we assembled 265 names of Islamic extremists
who are citizens or residents of a western country, and have come to
western authorities’ attention for carrying out or plotting a terrorist
attack in the West.6 Altogether 36 plots are covered.
The sample is close to the universe of violent Islamic extremists
caught in the West up until the end of 2006. Out of 265 individuals,
259 are residents (many of them citizens) of 13 western countries.
We searched for biographical information on the names in our list
in a variety of public sources. Despite the fact that most of these
individuals were caught, tried or died in the West under intense media
scrutiny, we found information on the education of only 54 cases and
information on the occupation of 38 additional cases.
Among the 54 for whom we found educational information, 21 had
secondary education, while 33 had either some university exposure
(20) or a university degree (13). We found information on the type of
degree pursued by 22 out of those 33 (Table 2): nearly all are from the
above-mentioned ‘‘elite degrees’’ and engineers alone represent 59.1 %.
6 The bulk of individuals, 229, come from
Bakker who has assembled a comprehensive
list of European jihadists (Bakker 2006,
p. 59 sq.).
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Even if the overall number of graduates we identified were lower than
the real number of graduates in the sample, there is no reason to
believe that the distribution by degree should be significantly biased.
In addition, the 33 individuals with known university exposure are
spread over 14 of the 36 acts or plots in the sample.
While the engineering overrepresentation survives in the western
sample and appears even stronger, the proportion of graduates is
lower: in the sample of 404 non-Western jihadists, the share of those
with higher education even if we include missing cases is no less than
48.5 %, while in the western sample the corresponding proportion is
12.5 % (33/265), despite much higher tertiary enrolment rates in
Western countries. As the missing cases in the Western sample are
spread evenly across groups, we suspect that non-reporting of higher
education indicates absence thereof – for why should it be reported
for some individuals in the same group, but not others? The criminal
background of around 20 % of cases and the fact that the 38 in-
dividuals on which we found occupational data all held non-professional
jobs, also lead us to conclude that levels of education are much
lower.
In conclusion, the evidence suggests that compared to the cases in
our Muslim world sample, the Western based jihadists have attracted
far fewer graduates and fewer qualified individuals and many more
from a lower class and lower middle class background. Yet, despite
this apparent ‘‘lumpen’’ status of Islamic extremists in the West, we
find among them proportionally even more engineers than in the first
sample.
t a b l e i i
Type of university degree, complete or incomplete
Type of degree N %
Engineering 13 59.1
Natural sciences 4 18.2
Economics, business, accountancy 3 13.6
Sports science 1 4.5
Social work 1 4.5
Total known 22 100
Unknown 11 –
Total 33 –
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3. Non violent Islamists
The individuals in the samples considered so far include only
members of violent groups, but what about non-violent Islamic move-
ments? One thing we know for certain is that Islamic parties and
movements usually contain a fair share of highly educated individu-
als.7 With respect to the distribution of subjects there are both
similarities and differences relative to the sample of violent Islamic
groups in the Muslim world.
We managed to collect data on a variety of non-violent groups in eight
of the Islamic countries in our sample (see Table 3). They show a striking
difference from our samples of violent groups: in non-violent Islamic
activism engineers, although strongly present, appear to be far less domi-
nant. They are joined by a strong, often stronger contingent of other
elite degrees (OEDs) such as medicine, pharmacology and science.
If we consider that OEDs constitute only around 10 % of the total
male student body in the Egyptian and Jordanian cases, i.e. equal or
less than engineers, OEDs appear to be clearly overrepresented among
non-violent groups, and at least as strongly represented as engineers.
By contrast, in our main sample there are only 23 OED cases and
78 engineers. While Islamist radicalization seems to appeal to both
engineers and other elite students, engineers seem more prone to end
up in violent groups (Table 4).
4. Non-Islamic extremists
Could this mean that engineers are more prone to militant extremism
in general? To test for this we carried out a survey of literature and
several primary sources on an assortment of violent groups outside of
the Islamic world (see Table 5). Although far from exhaustive, the
gathered information covers a large set that reveals clear patterns.
First, we failed to find engineers among left-wing extremists active
after World War II, despite their generally high levels of education:
left-wingers of the RAF, the Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red
Brigades, and Latin American urban guerrilla groups included almost
no engineers, but were rather dominated by law and humanities
7 Best 1999; Hoffman 1995; Lobmeyer
1995; Moore 1994; Munson 1986;
Wickham 2002.
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students. Anarchists with 6 engineers among cases with a known
degree (compared to 20 lawyers) are only a partial exception.
By contrast, among right-wing extremists, who generally had much
lower levels of education, engineers if not over-represented are at least
clearly present. Among 287 right-wing extremists and neo-Nazis in
Germany and Austria involved in 33 groups, we found 29 individuals
with known higher education 6 of whom were engineers. In the US
extreme right, whose ideology often has a strong religious and
millenarian underpinning (Handler 1990) and whose members are
generally poorly educated, engineers have played a significant role as
t a b l e i i i
Degree distribution in non-violent Islamist groups
Country Groups Engineers
Other elite
subjects* Total
Egypt Muslim Brotherhood
MPs
18 12 88
Kuwait Islamist MPs 1 2 18
Jordan Islamic Action
Front founders
22 42 353
Syria Hizb ut-Tahrir
prisoners
10 17 59
Saudi Arabia Islamist dissidents 0 3 5
Morocco PJD MPs 3 9 42
Indonesia Various parties 5 2 16
Malaysia PAS, ABIM 0 1 4
Total 59 88 585
Sources: Azam 1997, Middle East newspapers, party, movement and parliamentary
websites, personal communication with Stephane Lacroix and Joshua Stacher.
*This includes medicine, pharmacology and basic sciences.
t a b l e i v
Percentages of engineers and oeds in violent and non-violent groups
% Engineers % OEDs Total (N)
Non-violent 40.1 59.9 100 (147)
Violent 77.2 22.8 100 (101)
9
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t a b l e v
Graduates and engineers in non-islamic radical groups
Anarchists Our search in the biographies of 700
international anarchists – covering
19th and 20th century individuals and
most European countries, the US,
Russia and several Asian countries –
yielded 54 cases with a known degree,
six of whom were engineers, 10 doctors,
20 lawyers, and 15 philosophers*.
Post WWII
Left-wing extremists
Most 1970s German left-wing terrorists
studied humanities (J€ager et al. 1981;
von Baeyer-Katte et al. 1983).
No engineer among 17 members of the
Rote Armee Fraktion cases with known
higher education (www.rafinfo.de).
In a sample of 67 members of the Italian
Red Brigades and other radical leftist
Italian groups, which is part of
a database under construction by
Valeria Pizzini-Gambetta, out of 34
known education achievements, 16 had
either a university degree (6) or some
university exposure (10); of those,
10 were in the arts, humanities or social
sciences, 3 in natural sciences, 1 in
maths, 1 in physics and 1 in
engineering.
Most radical US leftists were doctors,
lawyers or had a liberal arts education
(Smith and Morgan 1994).
Latin American left-wing radicals in late
1960s were mostly graduates of law,
humanities, and medicine (Russell and
Hildner 1971).
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Table v (Continued)
Members of the Japanese Red Army were
mostly university students or graduates
and mostly from liberal arts fields, with
only very few medical doctors or
students and one physicist (Patricia
Steinhoff, personal communication).
No example of engineers found anywhere
outside of Islamic world (Russell and
Hildner 1971; Smith and Morgan 1994;
J€ager et al. 1981; von Bayer-Katte et al.
1983; authors’ survey of numerous
websites).
Post WWII
Right-wing
extremists
A survey of three German right-wing
parties yields a presence of some
engineers, but no over-representation
compared to the share of engineers
among German graduates (federal and
state-level websites of
Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschlands, Republikaner and
Deutsche Volksunion).
Among 287 right-wing extremists and
neo-Nazis in Germany and Austria, we
found 29 individuals with known higher
education, involved in 33 groups, 6 of
whom were engineers.
Among seven educated leaders of
US extreme right-wing groups whose
degree or occupation we could establish,
three were educated as engineers and
another one worked in the electronics
industry (Smith and Morgan 1994; web
surveys).
*Survey of biographies on ,http://ytak.club.fr/index.html..
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leaders of several groups: out of seven individuals for whom we were
able to establish the degree, four were engineers. With generally fewer
graduates around, however, right-wing engineers do not stand out as
strikingly as Islamic radical engineers.
As a final step to delimit the phenomenon, we need to ask a narrower
question to control not for ideology but for country conditions: do
engineers have a propensity to become radicalized not in general but in
Islamic countries in particular? There is some evidence that local
context could explain their radicalization.
In their survey of 350 individuals members of eighteen groups of
urban left-wing revolutionaries in ten countries around the world
Russell and Miller (1977) found that engineers were never a significant
presence with two striking exceptions: Iranian and Turkish groups
had a high proportion of engineers, and Iran and Turkey were the only
Islamic countries in their survey.8 At a time when left-wing groups
were considered, by revolutionarily inclined youth worldwide, as the
best means to change the world, radical engineers seem to have been
prominent in them in the Islamic world too.
Our own search in the biographies of 205 non-Islamist Palestinian
militants seems to corroborate this finding.9 At least 101 of the 205
had higher education; among the 93 cases in which the subject is
reported, we found 16 doctors, 14 trained in economics or business-
related subjects, 10 lawyers and 10 engineers. So, unlike in left-wing
groups outside of the Islamic world, engineers are present among
non-Islamic Palestinian groups, though they are not over-represented
(cf. also Russell and Miller 1977, p. 28).
5. Summary of findings
The puzzle from which we started appears confirmed: the number
of militant engineers relative to the total population of engineers is
miniscule – yet engineers, relative to other graduates, are overrepre-
sented among violent Islamic radicals by three to four times the size
we would expect.
While the overrepresentation of university-educated individuals
among Islamic extremists varies by country, group and sample, the
8 For further references on engineers
in radical Iranian leftist movements cf.
Chehabi 1990, p. 89; Abrahamian 1989,
pp. 229 sq.).
9 Taken from Glen Rangwala’s compilation
of biographies; http://middleeastreference.
org.uk/palbiograph.html (accessed October
2006).
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engineering overrepresentation seems insensitive to all three varia-
tions – with the one exception of Saudi Arabia.
Among non-Islamic extremists, we find virtually no engineers in
the violent left-wing – in Europe, US, Japan and Latin America – even
in those groups in which highly educated individuals are predomi-
nant. Only in some Middle Eastern countries has there been a signif-
icant presence of engineers among left-wing radicals. On the extreme
right of the political spectrum, by contrast, while not overrepresented,
engineers are present in groups of various kinds all over the world.
In the rest of this paper, we shall not try to explain why certain
engineers rather than others became radicalized. Our goal is more
modest: we will try to explain only why engineers became more
radicalized than individuals with other degrees.
We will first argue that two plausible hypotheses – network-based
expansion of groups and the selection of engineers because of their
technical skills – do not survive close scrutiny. Next we will present
evidence supporting two other hypotheses – engineers’ peculiar cognitive
traits and dispositions, and the special social difficulties faced by
engineers in Islamic countries. Our argument is that the pattern of results
can be best explained by the interaction between these two forces.
6. Hypotheses: network diffusion
Illegal groups are set up in a clandestine fashion and their existence is
advertised along networks of pre-existing social bonds. If the prime
movers were, even accidentally, engineering students or graduates, their
t a b l e v i
Overrepresentation of university-educated individuals, engineers and
OEDs in radical Islamic groups
Country Type of group
University
educ. Engineers OEDs
Middle East Violent Islamists Yes Yes No
Non-violent Islamists Yes Yes Yes
S. Arabia Violent Islamists Yes No None
AQ1
South East Asia No Yes No
Western No Yes No
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network would be more likely to expand within the faculty in which they
work and socialize, among like-minded people with whom they interact
on a daily basis (for a strong statement of network explanations
cf. Sageman 2004). A combination of historical accident and network-
based diffusion could explain the engineers’ over-representation.
However, the more we find engineers to be over-represented in
different countries and different networks the less likely it is that their
presence is due to a historical contingency. Even in the most restrictive
interpretation, our main sample of jihadists contains four clusters –
North Africans, South East Asians, Palestinians and international
Arabs jihadists – which grew independently of each other, and
engineers are strongly present in all of them. We also find that engineers
are overrepresented among the Western based extremists, scattered
over several unconnected groups.
Moreover, in broad-based movements such as Hamas, network ef-
fects should become less important with the growing scale of mobili-
zation. None of this implies that the size of the engineering contingent
within each independent cluster is unaffected by network effects – it
very probably is. What we cannot explain by network effects are both
the disproportionate share of engineers who became prime movers
and their greater willingness to stay in or join a radical network even
if started by non-engineers.
7. Selection based on technical skills
What about the most obvious hypothesis: recruitment based on
technical skills? Technical knowledge can help in creating and
handling the tools of violence as well as in maintaining clandestine
communications.
Deliberate recruitment for technical tasks probably occurs with
respect to the internal allocation of tasks for specific operations – three
of the four 9/11 pilots for example were engineers. However, several
facts suggest that this explanation does not really work for recruitment
in general.
First, we have found no evidence at all of recruits being selected
by technical skills. Personal trust seems a more important criterion
in the formation of, for example, al-Qaeda cells (Sageman 2004,
p. 92). Bomb-making is usually performed by a few specialists, which
would leave the high share of engineers among many organizations
14
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unexplained. That engineers are mainly sought for their ability to fill
technical roles is also refuted by the case of Hamas where many
engineers serve in senior management positions with no technical
function (while many Hamas suicide bombers pursued religious
degrees, Pedahzur 2005).
Next, the technology involved in most violent attacks has been
relatively simple and did not require great expertise. It is much harder
to obtain good quality explosives than put them to use. Lastly, it is
doubtful that violent movements with a larger share of engineers have
mustered a greater destructive power than groups without. Consider,
for instance, the Saudi insurgency, which mounted devastating bomb
attacks in 2003 and 2004; or the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the IRA and
ETA separatist movements, whose members have come largely from
among the poorly educated and the working class.
8. The engineering ‘‘mindset’’
The cross-cutting presence of engineers in militant groups, seem-
ingly indifferent to time, social and country variations, is arguably
a sign that individual-level traits must be part of the explanation.
Having discarded the technical skills hypothesis, it is difficult to
imagine these traits as not being related to personality or mindset.
Regardless of which personality traits exactly are at work – some-
thing to which we shall return later – if the ‘‘mindset’’ hypothesis ob-
tains, a twofold prediction follows: first, we should find engineers to
have a greater predilection towards joining radical political groups regard-
less of Islam. Our findings concerning non-Islamic extremists show
that, to some extent, this is the case, but with respect to right-wing
groups only. If their mindset explains this divide between right-wing
and Islamist groups on the one hand, and left-wing groups on the
other, this would imply that it sustains the pursuit of radical change
only if this is aimed at establishing a strong, hierarchical social order.
Second, engineers compared with people in other disciplines
should also manifest more radical views. This prediction too should
be verifiable independently of Islamism.
Engineers’ political and religious views
We searched for evidence to test the latter by trying to discover
whether there is anything unusual in engineers’ political-ideological
15
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orientations. The best data we could find in this regard comes from
a survey of faculty members in undergraduate colleges and universi-
ties throughout the United States carried out in 1984 (Carnegie
Foundation 1984).10 Of the 9,968 faculty sampled 5,057 (50.7 %)
returned completed mail questionnaires. We selected the males and
looked at their self-reported political and religious views according to
their highest degree.
The results are startling (Table 7). The proportion of engineers who
declare themselves to be on the right of the political spectrum is greater
than in any other disciplinary group: 57.6 % of them are either
conservative or strongly conservative, as compared to 51.1 of econo-
mists, 42.5 of doctors and 33.5 % of scientists, 21.4 % of those in the
humanities, and 18.6 % of the social scientists, the least right-wing of all
disciplinary groups. Only 1.4 % of engineers are on the left, as opposed
to 12.9 % in the social sciences and 16.7 % in law. Perhaps this is an
uncanny coincidence, but the four fields at the top of the conservatism
scale – engineering, economics, medicine, and science – are the same
four secular fields we found at the top of our main jihadist sample.
This finding is not new. In an article in Science, Ladd and Lipset
(1972) uncovered the same result using an earlier and much larger
survey of the Carnegie Foundation on American academics carried out
in 1969. ‘‘No other variable, we have found’’, they concluded, ‘‘dif-
ferentiates politically among American academics as effectively as
their professional field’’ (ibid., p. 1091). This seems a strong indication
that choice of degree is a powerful proxy for ideological preferences.
The Carnegie survey reveals an even more surprising fact, hitherto
unnoticed, that strengthens the suspicion that the engineers’ mindset
may play a part in their proneness not only to radicalise to the right of the
political spectrum, but do so with a religious slant: engineers turn out to
be by far the most religious group of all academics – 66.5 %, followed
again by 61.7 % in economics, 49.9 % in sciences, 48.8 % of social
scientists, 46.3 % of doctors and 44.1 % of lawyers. Engineers and
economists are also those who oppose religion least (3.7 % and 3.0 %,
Table 8).
The gap between engineering and the other disciplines shows even
more clearly if we consider political and religious views jointly (Table 9,
10 Unfortunately, there is a surprising
dearth of data on type of degree in surveys
that include questions about political or re-
ligious orientations. In the many surveys
around the world which we checked, the type
of degree is not recorded; and in the very few
cases in which it is, the number of graduates
is either too small or the relevant opinions are
not recorded.
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first column): nearly half of the engineers in the sample are both
conservative and religious (46 %), followed by economists and, at quite
some distance, by doctors and scientists.
We also tested the effect of the various university degrees on the
probability of being both conservative and religious through a logistic
regression, which allowed us to control for other variables (Table 10).
It turns out that the odds of being both religious and conservative rather
than anything else are seven times greater for engineers relative to the
odds of a social scientist – far higher than those for any other subject.
Objections
The sources of this extraordinary bias are a puzzle in their own
right. But the first question that concerns us here is whether this has
t a b l e v i i
Percentage distributions of self-reported political views
by highest degree achieved, males only
Left Liberal
Middle
of the
road
Moderately
conservative
Strongly
conservative Total
Engineering 1.4 20.3 20.7 41.9 15.7 100
(217)
Economics &
Business
2.1 15.3 31.5 40.0 11.1 100
(235)
Medicine 5.2 27.9 24.4 37.8 4.7 100
(172)
Natural
Sciences
3.6 34.4 28.63 30.0 3.5 100
(751)
Law 16.7 36.1 22.2 25.0 0.0 100
(36)
Arts &
humanities
8.8 41.8 28.0 18.7 2.7 100
(679)
Social
sciences
12.9 49.7 18.8 15.0 3.6 100
(394)
Total 6.5
(161)
35.4
(879)
26.1
(648)
27.0
(670)
5.1
(126)
100.0
(2484)
Source: Our elaboration on Carnegie Foundation National Survey of Higher
Education 1984.
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anything to do with our phenomenon. Three objections could be
raised.
One could question whether this mindset is unique to academic
engineers. The answer is likely to be negative: similar results are
found on the political and religious opinions of students, both for ‘‘un-
socialised’’ beginners in the first four semesters and more advanced
ones. While the proportions are lower than among academics the
ranking is exactly the same, with engineers firmly at the top (see Table 9
above, columns 2 and 3, also Ladd and Lipset 1975, pp. 74-75).11
Still, one could further object, the phenomenon could be uniquely
American. Some old evidence suggests that at least the right-wing bias
occurs in the Middle East: a 1948 survey of 3890 Cairo University
students recorded the highest sympathies for fascist ideology among
engineering students (Botman 1984, p. 70). A survey of Canadian
professors also found that engineers are the least liberal of all (Nakhaie
and Brym 1999).
t a b l e v i i i
Percentage distributions of self-reported views on religion
by highest degree achieved, males only
Opposing
religion
Indifferent
to religion
Moderately
religious
Deeply
religious Total
Engineering 3.7 29.8 51.6 14.9 100 (215)
Economics &
Business
3.0 35.3 47.2 14.5 100 (235)
Natural
Sciences
11.8 38.3 37.3 12.6 100 (747)
Arts &
Humanities
7.5 34.6 42.8 15.2 100 (683)
Social sciences 9.3 41.9 41.7 7.1 100 (396)
Medicine 6.2 47.5 35.6 10.7 100 (177)
Law 5.9 50.0 35.3 8.8 100 (34)
Total 8.2
(204)
37.6
(936)
41.5
(1033)
12.6
(314)
100 (2487)
Source: Our elaboration on Carnegie Foundation National Survey of Higher
Education 1984.
11 The date of this survey can be obtained
at ICPSR, at the University of Michigan,
www.icpsr.umich.edu/.
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Non-US data that would allow us to combine political and religious
attitudes unfortunately are of much lesser quality. The International
Social Survey Programme’s 1998 survey was the only source we found
to cover both. The ISSP has been producing a series of annual cross-
national opinion surveys on samples of the general population, in which
each year is focused on a different social and political topic; 1998was the
most recent set to focus on religion and to include also information on
the position of respondents on the left-right political spectrum. As there
was no information on type of degree, we were forced, however, to use
various engineering-related professions as a proxy for an engineering
education.12
The results from 2816 cases in 16 mostly Western countries show
that engineers were not more religious than other graduates and only
insignificantly to the right of them. However, the combination of the two
characteristics occurred far more often among engineers than the null
hypothesis of non-correlation would predict – the only professional
category in which this happened. Whereas based on individual scores
on religiousness and right-wing attitudes we expected 9.4 % of en-
gineers to share both attributes, 13.9 %, actually did (significant at
0.05). This shows that at least a minority group within a larger
category displays the characteristic biases we found in the American
t a b l e i x
Proportions of subjects who are both conservative and religious as opposed to
anything else, among academics, graduates and undergraduates, males only
(percentages)*
Academics
N 5 2456
Graduates
N 5 18241
Undergraduates*
N 5 25377
Engineering 46.0 (99) 27.2 (833) 16.5 (641)
Economics & Business 34.6 (80) 25.5 (768) 14.3 (545)
Medicine 24.9 (43) 22.3 (417) –
Sciences 21.8 (161) 18.0 (760) 12.9 (846)
Arts & Humanities 14.6 (98) 11.0 (260) 9.4 (551)
Law 14.3 (5) 13.1 (199) –
Social sciences 11.0 (43) 8.6 (187) 6.3 (332)
Source: Our elaboration on two Carnegie Foundation National Surveys of Higher
Education, 1984 for academics and 1969 for graduates and undergraduates.
12 Professions in the survey were coded according to the 1988 ISCO classification.
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data. This is all we need to warrant our claim that on the margin,
engineers differ in the crucial traits of religiosity and conservatism.
Lastly, while striking in general, in which way could this combined
bias explain engineers’ attraction to radical Islamism in particular? An
affinity can be assumed between higher levels of religiousness and
attraction by Islamist militancy, but what about right-wing attitudes?
Engineers’ more extreme political preferences may explain why we
find them among right-wing extremists and virtually never among
left-wing ones, but why should it help us to explain their attraction to
Islamism?
An answer is that radical Islamists’ Weltanschauung demonstrably
shares several features with the worldviews found in the extreme
right. One such feature is a corporatist and mechanistic view of the
ideal society. Extremist Islamist literature rejects Western pluralism
t a b l e x
Probability of being both conservative and religious, logistic
regression coefficients, males only (N 5 2365)
Coefficients Significance Exponentials
Age in years .019* .001 1.019
Married .291 .089 1.338
Children .017 .983 .983
Engineer 1.953* .000 7.053
Economist 1.443* .000 4.233
Scientist & doctor .811* .000 2.251
Lawyer .345 .540 1.411
Art & humanities .208 .305 1.231
Excellent department .350* .008 1.419
Not published last
2 years
.401* .003 1.493
Not expecting
publications
.504* .000 1.655
Constant 2.585 .000 .075
-2 Log likelihood
ratio 2196.939
R square (Cox &
Snell) .093
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and argues for a unified, ordered society ruled by a strong Islamic
leader, in which an unassailable division of labour is created between
men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims, political leaders and
their flock. The fear of social chaos undermining this established order
is a leitmotif of Islamist thought (Hoffman 1995, pp. 218 sq.).
Unlike left-wing extremism, which aims at broadening the lines of
power and privilege, right-wing extremism aims to restore a lost, often
mythical order of privileges and authority, and emerges as a backlash
against displacement or status deprivation in a period of sharp social
change (Lipset and Raab 1971). In its underlying craving for a lost
order, its match with the radical Islamic ideology is undeniable: the
theme of returning to the order of the prophet’s early community is
omnipresent in most salafist and jihadist texts.
Nature of the mindset
What exactly about engineers’ mindset or cognitive disposition could
make them a good match for this ideological cocktail? We can conjecture
that engineering as a degree might be relatively more attractive to indi-
viduals seeking cognitive ‘‘closure’’ and clear-cut answers as opposed to
more open-ended sciences – a disposition which has been empirically
linked to conservative political attitudes (Jost et al. 2003; Amodio et al.
2007). Engineering is a subject in which individuals with a dislike for
ambiguity might feel comfortable. According to Nilufer G€ole, engi-
neers in (peaceful) Islamist parties in Turkey claim to know the ‘‘one
best way’’ of how to solve social problems through technical and
logical approaches, and despise the Kemalist elite of jurists who are
preoccupied with debates on abstract ideas (G€ole 1990, pp. 172 sq.).
Olivier Roy, aiming to explain why many Islamist intellectuals have
a scientific or technical education, points out that the sciences, in these
writers’ simplistic perception, reflect the ‘‘the coherence of the whole,
the rationality of the one [God]’’ (Roy 1990, p. 271; Hanafi 1997,
p. 148). By contrast, they refuse Western social sciences because these
disciplines challenge the unity and divine order of the world.
There is some evidence of recruitment being based precisely on
individual traits coherent with such dispositions. The ‘‘constitution’’
of al-Qaeda from the late 1980s says that members should ideally have
a college degree (Wright 2006, p. 42), and a training manual for jihadists
mentions a series of specific traits that recruiters seek: ‘‘discipline and
obedience, patience, intelligence’’ (p. 18), ‘‘caution and prudence’’ (p. 19),
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and ability ‘‘to observe and analyze’’ (p. 20).13 According to a British
intelligence dossier (The Sunday Times, 10 July 2005), Islamic
extremists are known to target schools and colleges where young people may be
very inquisitive but less challenging and more susceptible to extremist reasoning/
arguments. (The Sunday Times, 10 July 2005, our emphasis)
The dossier’s choice of adjectives is interesting: we can find people
who are inquisitive and challenging or supine and unchallenging, but
the combination of a sharp mind with a loyal acceptance of authority
may exist among accountants, but is unlikely to be common among
those ready to choose extreme paths. These traits that recruiters seek
could be more frequent, at least marginally, among engineers, and
recruiters themselves might be aware of this. The British intelligence
dossier further states that
‘‘a network of ‘extremist recruiters’ is circulating on campuses targeting people
with ‘technical and professional qualifications’, particularly engineering and IT
degrees.’’14
Abuza reports a similar recruitment strategy for Indonesia’s
Jemaah Islamiyah (Abuza 2006, p. 78).
Are these traits due to nature or nurture? Our evidence on freshmen
students (Table 9) indicates that individuals with specific political and
religious views, arguably reflecting an underlying forma mentis, self-
select into engineering programs, rather than come to their courses
tabula rasa. The education they receive is unlikely to correct for the
traits discussed above. Friedrich von Hayek, in 1952, made a strong
case for the peculiarity of the engineering mentality, which in his view
is the result of an education which does not train them to understand
individuals and their world as the outcome of a social process in which
spontaneous behaviours and interactions play a significant part.
Rather, it fosters on them a script in which a strict ‘‘rational’’ control
of processes plays the key role (Hayek 1952, pp. 94-102): this would
make them on the one hand less adept at dealing with the confusing
causality of the social and political realms and the compromise and
circumspection that these entail, and on the other hand inclined to
think that societies should operate orderly akin to well-functioning
machines – a feature which is reminiscent of the Islamist engineers in
13 ‘‘Military Studies in the Jihad against
the Tyrants’’, used in court in the trial, held
in New York from January to May 2001,
against four men charged in the 1998 em-
bassy bombings in East Africa. Identified in
the trial files as ‘‘Government Exhibit 1677’’.
Date and author are unknown.
14 www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/
article542420.ece (accessed in October 2006).
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Nilufer G€ole’s account. ‘‘It is not surprising’’, Hayek prophetically
concluded,
that many of the more active minds among those so trained sooner or later react
violently against the deficiencies of their education and develop a passion for
imposing on society the order which they are unable to detect by the means with
which they are familiar. (Hayek 1952, p. 102)
9. Frustrated ambitions
Even if it could be proven beyond dispute, the mindset hypothesis
cannot be the whole story. Why is the link between Islamic radicalism
and engineering absent in Saudi Arabia? And, given their putative
right-wing inclination, what can explain the strong presence of engi-
neers among left-wing extremists in 1970s Turkey and Iran, and their
moderate presence in the Palestinian Fatah, contrary to their glaring
absence everywhere else in this type of groups? These ‘‘anomalies’’
indicate that the social conditions in Islamic countries are likely to
play a key part in explaining the patterns of radicalization.
The position of engineers in Middle Eastern and North African countries
Researching Middle East educational systems we encountered time
and again a prominent feature of engineering: together with medicine
and natural sciences, it is the most prestigious subject and has high entry
requirements.15 Enrolling for an engineering degree is a strong sign of
above-average talent and ambition. A degree in engineering carries
more than a mere technical expertise, but also high social status
(Cornand 1990; Wickham 2002). Many students choose it as much be-
cause of their interest in the subject as because of the prestige it con-
fers (Hanafi 1990, p. 173). ‘‘Muhandis’’, engineer, is a title of honour
in Arab countries.
Many Middle East regimes entertained a technocratic rhetoric of
development and actively encouraged the growth of technical faculties
and the mass enrolment of students (Richards and Waterbury 1996,
pp. 133-142). Even more than other elite subjects engineering has had
15 Moore 1994, p. 46 sq.; Cornand 1990,
p. 192; Sonbol 1988, pp. 26 sq.; Kepel 1993,
pp. 136 sq.
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a special attraction. It is of more direct practical value, it conveys an
established solidity lacking in more academic pursuits, and arguably
does not lead one to challenge traditional religious tenets (Chehabi
1990, pp. 89 sq.).
Individuals with above-average skills selected on merit are, one
would expect, particularly exposed to the frustration and the sense of
injustice that comes from finding their professional future hampered
by lack of opportunities. This happened on a large scale as a result of
the economic and technological development failures that Middle East
countries have witnessed since the 1970s.16 A particularly painful
economic crisis set in with the collapse of the oil price after 1982, right
around the time in which many engineers in our sample went through
university and became radicalised. The effect of the lack of opportu-
nities was intensified by the corrupt, state-driven job allocation.
For the [Egyptian] graduates who had been socialized to view
themselves as a meritocratic elite, perhaps the greatest source of
bitterness was what they perceived as an erosion of the link between
merit and reward. (Wickham 2002, p. 159)
It appears that engineers’ and OEDs’ high ambitions and high
frustration collided. They felt fooled by the development rhetoric of
their regimes and felt they deserved more than they could get. They
were not just frustrated on a self-interested level, but felt unable to
discharge a collective responsibility in modernizing Islamic countries,
to live up professionally to their role as ‘‘vanguards’’ of society in
which regimes had cast them (Wickham 2002, p. 32; Apter 1965,
pp. 219 sq.). This negative experience is a plausible factor that
contributed to their radicalisation. While it was felt more by people
with higher education than by the rest of the population, and could
thus explain the general over-representation of the highly educated
among Islamic radicals, it was felt even more strongly by the high
achievers. This negative experience is a very plausible factor that
contributed to their radicalisation. Detailed accounts of Egypt’s
education, development, and labour market history fit this explanation
perfectly and link it explicitly to radicalization of university gradu-
ates.17 Engineers’ declining socio-economic status and frustrations
after the 1970s are well-documented for a number of Arab countries.18
16 Longuenesse 1990; Oxford Analytica
2006; UNDP 2003, pp. 97-109.
17 Ibrahim 1980; Moore 1994; Kepel
1993; Wickham 2002.
18 Cf. Longuenesse 1990, 2000; Akkache
1990; Hanafi 1990; Cornand 1990.
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These signs point to a classic explanation of the onset of rebel
movements – frustrated rising expectations and relative deprivation –
dating back to Aristotle and Tocqueville (Davies 1962; Gurr 1970).
This explanation has been traditionally used to explain inter-country
differences in radicalisation, while in this case it could account not so
much for the emergence of the movement as a whole as for the social
composition within each country’s radical sector. It could explain why
more graduates generally radicalised in the Middle East and why more
engineers and OEDs in particular did so, even in the case of several
leftist movements. Conversely, it could also explain why in the West
and in Singapore, both of which unlike Middle Eastern countries have
seen very successful economic development, much fewer graduates are
found among radicals.
The Saudi exception
If frustration with dismal professional opportunities indeed con-
tributed to their radicalization, we should find less radical engineers
where conditions were more favourable. This is exactly what the
exception of Saudi Arabia seems to demonstrate. Saudi Arabia is the
only nation whose violent radicals show no over-representation of engi-
neers in our sample. There is very good evidence that Saudi engineers
have had much better labour market chances than their peers in any of
the non-Gulf Middle Eastern states. The Saudi market has long been
able to absorb all its graduates from prestigious technical subjects. The
Saudi private sector has time and again petitioned the government to
produce more graduates with technical education.19 As the human
resources manager of a large Saudi bank told one of us, unlike in other
countries where business graduates are the most sought after, their
first recruitment target are the engineers.20 With such favourable
labour market conditions it is even surprising that we still find two
engineers in our samples.
Repression and resentment
We now have the elements of a potentially explosive mix. However,
this would have remained inert had it not been for one crucial factor: the
19 Interviews with private sector represen-
tatives, Riyadh, 2003 to 2005.
20 Interview with Norlida Azmi, assistant
general manager, SAMBA Financial Group,
Riyadh, December 2005.
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harsh repression on the part of the authoritarian Islamic governments,
which by all accounts played a crucial part in inducing radicalisation
generally regardless of the engineering phenomenon.
In Turkey, a country in which both democratic institutions and
economic development have been in relatively better shape, we find
fewer violent Islamic extremists of any kind. Elsewhere, repressive and
corrupt regimes that failed to live up to their developmental promises
narrowed the openings for frustrated elites to manifest their opposition.
Other than acquiescence, joining radical movements became the only
option (Hafez 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004).
By itself, however, repression cannot explain the overrepresentation
of the engineers, as it could have affected individuals with other degrees.
Its specific effects could be of two kinds: either engineers were already
overrepresented among the opposition movements targeted by repres-
sion and became radicalised by the experience just like everyone else;
repression would thus be relevant for everyone whether engineers or
non-engineers in the same way. Or engineers were not initially over-
represented among those who suffered from repression, but responded
to it in a more extreme way; in this case repression might have interacted
with the mindset leading more engineers to become violent extremists.
The stronger presence of OEDs among peaceful Islamists movements
makes the latter more plausible for in so far as repression targeted
Islamic movements of all descriptions, OEDs too should have been
exposed to it.
To be relevant for our puzzle, repression and Islamic radical ideology
must have interacted with ‘‘the engineering mindset’’ in a special way.
By canvassing a stricter version of the religion, it offered the best
available opportunity to strengthen the flagging confidence of aspiring
elites vis-a`-vis Western technical and cultural supremacy, and became
the haven for frustrated individuals of high potential. Islamic ideology
proved a peculiarly well suited means to reduce the cognitive dissonance
and turn resentment into a political resource. Its cocktail of tradition
and modernization might have been a particularly good match for
engineers. This is arguably the crucial juncture at which the effects of
frustrated expectations, individual as well as collective, joined forces
with the engineering mindset. Where would-be militant engineers had
the choice between joining a secular and traditional leftist group or an
Islamic one, they chose the latter in greater numbers: in 1970s Iran
humanities and social science students dominated among Marxist
guerrillas, whereas ‘‘physical sciences’’ dominated among the Islamo-
marxist Mojahedin E-Khalk (Hoffman 1995, p. 206). And in Palestine
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proportionally many more engineers opted to join Hamas than secular
Fatah.
10. An overview
The most plausible explanation of the engineers’ over-representa-
tion among violent Islamic radicals everywhere lies in the joint effect
of two causes. Without the severe lack of professional opportunities
that they had to endure in Middle Eastern countries we would not find
an over-representation of graduates, especially from elite degrees,
among violent Islamic radicals – as indeed we do not find it either in
the West, in Singapore or even in Saudi Arabia where we know that
graduates fared much better professionally. This pattern clearly points
to the importance of relative deprivation and frustrated expectations,
a theory that may have been abandoned too hastily, partly perhaps
because it was applied at too macro a level, that is to explain country
rather than group differences.
However, without their mindset, which inclines them to take more
extreme conservative and religious positions everywhere, even in Mid-
dle Eastern countries engineers would have behaved as those with
OEDs, largely limiting themselves to non-violent forms of radical-
isation. The mindset could also explain why even in the Western and
South East Asian groups in which graduates did not experience the same
professional frustration they had in Middle Eastern countries, the
engineers’ overrepresentation is strong: even if there are very few
graduates, most of them are engineers. In the case of the Middle East,
deprivation and mindset seem to have worked together, selecting elite
graduates first and then engineers among them, which could explain the
much larger scale of the phenomenon, while in the West and in
Singapore mindset alone seems to explain the phenomenon, which in
absolute term is much smaller.
The only other case in which we find a trace of engineers’ pro-
minence outside of Islamic violent groups is, consistent with the
mindset hypothesis, among the most extreme right-wing movements,
especially in the US and in Germany, where it is all the more striking
again given the general low level of education of the members of such
groups. Here we have perhaps the only other case in which the
mindset alone has activated engineers into resorting to violent action –
their absolute number is tiny, but disproportionate relative to other
types of graduates.
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Resume
L’article montre que parmi les terroristes
islamistes de par le monde, les titulaires
d’une formation d’ingenieur sont trois a`
quatre fois plus nombreux que tous autres
diploˆmes. Differentes hypothe`ses sont ex-
plorees. La combinaison de deux facteurs –
frustration relative des ingenieurs dans le
monde islamique et traits culturels semble
fournir l’explication la plus plausible.
Mots cles : Jihad ; Islamisme ; Ingenieurs ;
Violence politique ; Frustration relative.
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz verdeutlicht, dass unter islam-
istischen Terroristen die Anzahl der Ingen-
ieure, im Gegensatz zu anderen
Hochschulabschl€ussen, drei bis viermal
h€oher ist. Die Kombination zweier Faktoren:
relative Frustrierung der Ingenieure in der
islamischen Welt und Geisteshaltung,
scheint die plausibelste Erkl€arung zu sein.
Schlagw€orter: Djihad; Islamismus; Ingen-
ieure; Politische Gewalt; Erziehung; Rela-
tiver Verlust.
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